Editorial | Asserting the Monroe Doctrine

When Donald Trump won the US presidential election more than a year ago, this newspaper stressed the good sense of the small nations of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) coordinating their policies to avoid, as much as possible, having their interests subverted by Mr Trump’s muscular assertion of America’s power.

As Mr Trump has pursued his so-called America First agenda and undermined institutions on which small states depended for some cover, the 15-member community has, to some degree, attempted to leverage its numbers and collective voice, in defence of its concerns. The community’s insistence, for instance, that the Caribbean should remain a zone of peace in the face of Mr Trump’s military muscle-flexing against Nicolas Maduro’s regime in Venezuela is one such circumstance. But the region’s principled stance on this issue, unfortunately, hasn’t been unanimous.

Trinidad and Tobago, under Prime Minister Kamla Persaud-Bissessar, demurred. She appears to believe that the better policy is obsequiousness and appeasement.

It is unlikely, however, that CARICOM can attempt, interminably, to merely navigate the raindrops, or punt its relationship with the United States, without having to abandon critical global partnerships, or fall within one geopolitical camp or the other.

These could well become (Thomas) Hobson’s Choice for CARICOM’s members, if they fail to fashion a clear, thoughtful and coherent response to Mr Trump’s National Security Strategy (NSS), published by the White House last week.

TRUMP COROLLARY

Much of the global attention has been on the Trump administration’s perception of Europe as a declining region, at a civilisational crossroads because of non-white immigration. But, stripped to its core, the document centres America’s global relationship on an aggressive reassertion of the Monroe Doctrine.

Fundamentally, Mr Trump has reawakened the old notion of the Western Hemisphere as America’s backyard, where it holds dominance and influence, while reserving the right to extend the doctrine’s precepts to other parts of the world in pursuance of declared US interests.

Broadly, America wants the countries of the hemisphere to be reasonably well governed, and prosperous enough to “discourage mass migration to the United States”. It also wants cooperation to prevent a flow of narcotics across its borders.

But the administration’s more consequential declaration, in the context of the Monroe Doctrine, is that the hemisphere should be “ free of hostile foreign incursion or ownership of key assets … that supports critical supply chains; and we want to ensure our continued access to key strategic locations”.

Adds the document: “ In other words, we will assert and enforce a ‘Trump Corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine …”

Expanding on these issues, it says: “ Non-Hemispheric competitors have made major inroads into our Hemisphere, both to disadvantage us economically in the present, and in ways that may harm us strategically in the future. Allowing these incursions without serious pushback is another great American strategic mistake of recent decades. The United States must be pre-eminent in the Western Hemisphere as a condition of our security and prosperity – a condition that allows us to assert ourselves confidently where and when we need to in the region.

“The terms of our alliances, and the terms upon which we provide any kind of aid, must be contingent on winding down adversarial outside influence – from control of military installations, ports, and key infrastructure to the purchase of strategic assets broadly defined. Some foreign influence will be hard to reverse, given the political alignments between certain Latin American governments and certain foreign actors. However, many governments are not ideologically aligned with foreign powers but are instead attracted to doing business with them for other reasons, including low costs and fewer regulatory hurdles.

“The United States has achieved success in rolling back outside influence in the Western Hemisphere by demonstrating, with specificity, how many hidden costs – in espionage, cybersecurity, debt-traps, and other ways – are embedded in allegedly “low cost” foreign assistance. We should accelerate these efforts, including by utilising U.S. leverage in finance and technology to induce countries to reject such assistance.”

TRICKLE OF US INVESTMENT

Notably, this review does not deal with the small island states of the Caribbean as a subset of the hemisphere, or with special problems they face, including the existential threat of climate change. But it is obvious they would fall among the group where America perceives malign “foreign influences” which should be rolled back.

For this, read China. Beijing has made substantial loans to Caribbean governments, and its firms have invested significantly in the region, including Jamaica.

Indeed, a Chinese company is the minority owner of the firm that runs Kingston’s transshipment port. Another Chinese company invested over US$700 million to build the tolled North-South highway. Additionally, the Chinese government, through its various banks, has loaned Jamaica hundreds of millions of dollars for infrastructure investment.

Much of these loans, in Jamaica and elsewhere, came when little or no capital flowed from elsewhere. The trickle of US investment into Jamaica is highlighted in the US State Department report that America’s stock of foreign direct investment in the island in 2023 was only US$276 million.

There is no signal that CARICOM, but for the territories with substantial commodities like Guyana with oil, is on the radar of American firms for investment, even if the Chinese went into full retreat.

The national security document, therefore, raises several critical questions for the region, which CARICOM can best address as a group rather than as individual countries.

Should they not hang together, hanging separately is a real possibility.